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I. Introduction 
The Spanish Constitutional Court was created by the Constitu-
tion of 1978, which definitively replaced the dictatorial rule of 
General Franco. Said Constitution defines Spain as ‘a social 
and democratic State under the rule of law’. As regards the form 
of state, Spain constitutes a ‘quasi-federal parliamentary mon-
archy’.1 
Since its creation and for almost forty years, the Constitutional 
Court has contributed to the consolidation of democracy, rule of 
law, and fundamental rights and above all, to the definition and 
implementation of the so-called ‘state of autonomies’, which is 
to say, to the extent and limits of devolution.2 
This paper aims to critically assess the functioning and inde-
pendence of the Constitutional Court of Spain, a topic more rel-
evant than ever, not only due to the alarming developments in 
                                                   
* I would like to thank colleagues Ignacio Borrajo Iniesta and Miguel 
Azpitarte Sánchez for their comments on this paper. The usual dis-
claimer applies. 
1  Victor Ferreres Comella, The Constitution of Spain – A Contextual 
Analysis (Oxford: Hart 2013), p. 48. 
2  For an introduction, see Pedro José González-Trevijano Sánchez, El 
Tribunal Constitucional (Cizur Menor: Aranzadi 2000); Jorge Lozano 
Miralles and Albino Saccomanno, El Tribunal Constitucional (Valen-
cia: Tirant lo Blanch 2000); Sabela Oubiña Barbolla, El Tribunal Con-
stitucional – Pasado, presente y futuro (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch 
2012); Juan Luis Requejo Pagés, ‘Das spanische Verfas-
sungsgericht’, in A. von Bogdandy, C. Grabenwarter and P. M. Huber 
(eds.), Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum – Band VI Verfas-
sungsgerichtsbarkeit in Europa: Institutionen (Heidelberg: CF Müller 
2016), pp. 639-703; Xabier Arzoz, ‘Constitutional Court of Spain’, in 
R. Grote, F. Lachenmann and R. Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Ency-
clopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2018), which can be downloaded at www.mpeccol.com. 
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some Central European states, but also to the fact that the in-
dependence of constitutional jurisdictions everywhere is intrin-
sically conditioned on their proximity to political organs, as re-
gards selection and activity. The independence of a constitu-
tional court depends on many factors. From a constitutional per-
spective, an obvious choice is to focus on the status of consti-
tutional judges and their appointment mechanism. Therefore, 
this paper will forgo exploring other critical issues, such as 
standing, extension of constitutional review and other organisa-
tional questions (law clerks, deciding rules, dissenting opinions, 
etc.). Nevertheless, the design of Spanish constitutional judicial 
review strongly resembles that of Germany. 
This paper is divided into two parts. The first part reviews con-
stitutional and legal requirements that safeguard the functioning 
and independence of the Constitutional Court of Spain and 
looks for deficiencies in the existing framework. In its second 
part, the paper traces the relevant challenges to the Constitu-
tional Court’s independence that have occurred in the past forty 
years. Major pressure on the Spanish Constitutional Court have 
come, on the one hand, from political parties and, on the other, 
in recent times from the Catalonian secessionist movement. 
Lastly, the paper ends by reaching a conclusion on the matter. 
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II. Safeguarding functioning and independence 
In the constitutional debate, there was no opposition to the idea 
of creating a constitutional court.3 Nevertheless, the members 
of the constituent assembly considered the Constitutional Court 
a predominantly political body.4 Although it bears the name and 
has the functions of a ‘court’, the Constitutional Court is set 
apart from the judiciary branch of government. Title VI of the 
Constitution refers to the judiciary and Title IX to the Constitu-
tional Court. The Constitution of 1978 preserved the centennial 
Supreme Court, which was explicitly proclaimed Spain’s ‘high-
est judiciary body in all branches of justice, except with regard 
to the provisions concerning constitutional guarantees’.5 There-
fore, the text of the Constitution implies a kind of dual apex (or 
dual hegemony) instead of a hierarchic relationship; the Su-
preme Court stands as the highest judicial court, and the Con-
stitutional Court operates as the highest specialized court for 
constitutional guarantees.  
Nevertheless, legal provisions offer a less ambiguous design. 
First, the organic law of the Constitutional Court defines the 
Court as the ‘supreme interpreter of the Constitution’ proclaim-
ing its independence from other constitutional bodies, requiring 
it to abide only by the Constitution and its organic law, and mak-
ing it clear that no institution can challenge its jurisdiction or 
competence.6 Second, the same organic law assigns the name 
                                                   
3  Pablo Pérez Tremps, Tribunal Constitucional y poder judicial (Madrid: 
Centro de Estudios Constitucionales 1985), pp. 97–109. 
4  Francisco Rubio Llorente, La forma del poder – Estudios sobre la 
Constitución, 3rd ed. (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitu-
cionales 2012), p. 1396. 
5  Art. 123(2). 
6  Art. 1 and 4 of Organic Law no. 2/1979 of the Constitutional Court 
(several times amended). 
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to the members of the Court – ‘judges of the Constitutional 
Court’ (magistrados del Tribunal Constitucional), a denomina-
tion equivalent to that of the judges of the Supreme Court and 
therefore stressing the judicial character of the institution. Third, 
ordinary courts and judges are not allowed to review nor not 
apply legislation that is, or may be, unconstitutional – they must 
appeal to the Constitutional Court –, and fourth, the organic law 
of the judiciary requires all judges and courts to interpret and 
apply legal norms in accordance with the Constitution, as well 
as with the case law of the Constitutional Court.7 All of these 
legal provisions assure the supremacy of the Constitutional 
Court within the legal order. As we will see later, however, it has 
not avoided conflict with the judiciary in those areas with regard 
to the enforcement of individual rights, where judges and courts 
are primarily responsible but the Constitutional Court may re-
view their decisions. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Spanish constitution-
maker was inspired greatly by the German model of constitu-
tional jurisdiction.8 Nevertheless, it imported from Germany only 
procedures necessary for the objective guarantee of the Con-
                                                   
7  Art. 5 (1) of Organic Law no. 6/1985 of the Judiciary (several times 
amended). 
8  See Pedro Cruz Villalón, ‘Das Grundgesetz im internationalen Wir-
kungszusammenhang der Verfassungen. Bericht Spanien’, in 
U. Battis, E. G. Mahrenholz and D. Tsatsos (eds.), Das Grundgesetz 
im internationalen Wirkungszusammenhang der Verfassungen – 
40 Jahre Grundgesetz (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1990), pp. 93-108; 
Francisco Balaguer Callejón and Miguel Azpitarte Sánchez, ‘Das 
Grundgesetz als ein Modell und sein Einfluss auf die spanische Ver-
fassung von 1978’, (2010) Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts 58,  
15-39; and Pedro Cruz Villalón, ‘La Ley Fundamental en la evolución 
constitucional española (1978-2008)’, in C. Hohmann-Dennhardt, 
R. Scholz and P. Cruz Villalón, Las Constituciones alemana y espa-
ñola en su aniversario (Madrid: CEPC 2011), pp. 43-60. 
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stitution and deliberately omitted all procedures for the subjec-
tive guarantee of the Constitution that are recognised in the 
German basic law such as the deprivation of individuals’ funda-
mental rights, the prohibition of political parties, and the im-
peachment of the Federal President and federal judges.9 This 
deliberate exercise of ‘negative reception’ has to do with the 
negative experience of the predecessor to the Constitutional 
Court – the Court for Constitutional Guarantees – during the 
Second Republic (1931-1939) with the trial of Catalonia Presi-
dent Companys.10 As such, the drafters of the Constitution in 
1978 opted for the ‘purity’ of the Spanish constitutional jurisdic-
tion, exclusively centred on constitutional review of norms and 
legal acts instead of on individuals and the protection of individ-
ual rights.  
1. Appointment 
The Court is composed of twelve judges, appointed formally by 
the King for nine-year, non-renewable terms. Four are nomi-
nated by the lower house of the Parliament (Congreso) by a 
three-fifths majority of its members, four by the upper house of 
the Parliament or Senate (Senado) with the same majority, two 
                                                   
9  Art. 18, 21(1), 61 and 98(2) of the German Basic Law. The differenti-
ation between objective and subjective guarantee of the Constitution 
comes from Kelsen. See Hans Kelsen, ‘Wesen und Entwicklung der 
Staatsgerichtsbarkeit‘, (1929) Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung 
Deutscher Staatsrechtlehrer 5, p. 44. 
10  On its predecessor, see Wilhelm Boucsein, Verfassungssicherung 
und Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der zweiten spanischen Republik: 
1931–1936 (Hanau: Haag-Herchen 1977); Pedro Cruz Villalón, La 
formación del sistema europeo de control de constitucionalidad 
(1918–1939) (Madrid: CEC 1987), pp. 301-340; and Manuel Bassols 
Coma, La jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Garantías Constitucionales 
de la II República Española (Madrid: CEC 1987). 
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by the Government, and two by the General Council of the Ju-
diciary also by a majority of three-fifths.11 Nominations are 
divided into thirds, so that a third of judges are replaced every 
three years. Their appointments and terms do not coincide with 
the terms of the electing bodies. This form of divided or seg-
mented appointment of the members of the Constitutional Court 
by the three branches of the government has no exact equiva-
lent in comparative constitutional law.12 The General Council of 
the Judiciary has the limited power of governing the organiza-
tion of the judiciary, but it does not have any jurisdictional 
power, as that lies exclusively with the judges and courts. 
Constitutional judges must be appointed from amongst higher 
court judges, public prosecutors, university professors, public 
officials and lawyers, all of whom must be Spanish nationals 
and jurists of recognized standing with at least fifteen years’ ex-
perience in professional exercise.13 The objective qualifications 
required to be appointed are not particularly strict. This is clear 
with regard to the broad category of ‘public officials’, but also 
the other professions mentioned. For instance, the notion of 
‘higher court judges’ (magistrados) includes not only judges of 
the highest courts of the State as in some other constitutional 
jurisdictions but also judges sitting at the appellate level or in 
specialized jurisdictions; additionally, university professors are 
eligible even if they do not hold a full chair or a law professorship 
or a professorship at a Spanish university (provided that they 
                                                   
11  Art. 127(1)(b) of the Organic Law of the Judiciary.  
12  José Antonio Estrada Marún, La designación de los magistrados del 
Tribunal Constitucional en España. Una perspectiva orgánica y 
empírica (Cizur Menor: Aranzadi-Thomson Reuters 2017), p. 51; 
Rafael Naranjo de la Cruz and Gaspar González Represa, ‘Artículo 
159’, in Yolanda Gómez (ed.), Estudios sobre la reforma de la 
Constitución de 1978 en su cuarenta aniversario (Aranzadi: Cizur 
Menor 2018), p. 404. 
13  Art. 159 (2) of the Constitution. 
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are jurists and Spaniards). Nor are the fifteen years of profes-
sional exercise a fine filter. With regard to the subjective re-
quirement of ‘recognized standing’, candidates to be proposed 
by the legislative chambers must go through a hearing before 
the corresponding chamber.14 However, there is no similar pro-
cedure for candidates that are appointed by the Government 
and the General Council of the Judiciary. 
Legislation has not added further limitations or requirements for 
eligibility; for instance, there is no requirement, as in Germany, 
for the inclusion in each Court chamber of a certain number of 
judges from the highest courts of the State,15 nor a minimum 
and/or a maximum age to serve as a constitutional judge,16 nor 
the requirement to be active in the relevant juridical profession 
at the moment of the appointment. In practice, however, almost 
all appointed judges have been either full law professors or 
judges from the Supreme Court (from any of its five jurisdiction-
based chambers, although mostly from its Administrative Law 
Chamber).17 
Due to the high number of votes needed, in practice, the two 
main political parties (since 1982, the Socialist Party and the 
conservative People’s Party) decide on the nominations in the 
                                                   
14  Art. 16(2) of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court, as amended 
by Organic Law no. 6/2007. 
15  Paragraph 2(3) of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court  
(BVerfGG). 
16  Paragraphs 3(1) and 4(2) of the Law on the Federal Constitutional 
Court (BVerfGG). 
17  To be exact, out of 63 constitutional judges appointed until 2019, 35 
have been full professors of law and 25 high judges (23 of them from 
the Supreme Court). The rest were two practising lawyers (Fernando 
García-Mon y González-Regueral and Eugenio Gay Montalvo, which 
had also been the Chairperson of the Lawyers National Bar Associa-
tion), and one public prosecutor (Antonio Narváez Rodríguez). See 
Naranjo de la Cruz and González Represa, cit., p. 408. 
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legislature and, indirectly, also in the General Council of the Ju-
diciary (which itself is elected by the two branches of the legis-
lature). Therefore, the nomination of two judges by the Govern-
ment every nine years can shift the majority in the Court ideo-
logically closer to one of the main parties or the other. The elec-
tion of the two judges by the Government every nine years may 
have an impact similar to the presidential designation of judges 
to the US Supreme Court, in the sense that it is the golden op-
portunity for the executive branch to change or reinforce the 
ideological profile of the Court, but unlike in the US, government 
designations does not require approval or ratification by a leg-
islative chamber.18 
After the nomination by the electing body and before the formal 
appointment by the King, the Constitutional Court reviews 
whether each nominee fulfils the constitutional requirements for 
the position.19 The Court acts as if that review were just a for-
mality. It limits itself to assessing whether the candidate com-
plies with the formal requirements of legal education and fifteen 
years of professional exercise, without checking whether he or 
she has ‘recognized standing’.20 In almost forty years of expe-
rience, only one candidate has had difficulties passing said re-
view, although twice.21  
                                                   
18  On three occasions, socialist governments have enjoyed the so-called 
‘majority premium’ (1986, 1995 and 2004), while centrist and con-
servative governments only once each (1980 and 2013, respectively). 
19  Art. 2(g) and 10(i) of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court. 
20  For the need to assess candidates’ extent of legal experience, 
reasoning skills and expertise in constitutional and European case-
law, see Javier García Roca, ‘La selección de los magistrados 
constitucionales, su estatuto y la necesaria regeneración de las 
instituciones’, (2012) Revista General de Derecho Constitucional 15, 
p. 16. 
21  Enrique López López. 
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In 2010, the Board of the Senate excluded said candidate in as 
far as he did not fulfil the requirement of fifteen years of profes-
sional practice as a judge, ruling that periods of leave to serve 
in non-judicial posts could not be considered effective profes-
sional practice. Nevertheless, the People’s Party again backed 
his candidacy in June 2013, this time through a direct appoint-
ment by the Government. The Constitutional Court stood di-
vided in exactly two halves with regard to whether the nominee 
complied with the required qualification; finally, the President of 
the Court cast the deciding vote, and the candidate was formally 
appointed by the King.22 This was, obviously, the worst-case 
scenario. The newly appointed constitutional judge was proba-
bly resentful of the situation, and those who had voted against 
him were probably annoyed by the imposition of their new col-
league, this all thanks to the deciding vote of a President who 
was to leave the institution after that very decision given that his 
term of office had expired. The lack of prudence by the political 
party promoting this appointment contributed to the erosion of 
both the Court’s cohesion and its authority.23 
Procedure and requirements regarding nomination of constitu-
tional judges are one of the recurring topics of constitutional dis-
cussion. Since they are constitutionally entrenched, a constitu-
tional reform in accordance with the procedure laid down in 
Art. 167 is required for its amendment. Criticism on the proce-
dure and requirements of selections dates back to 1980.24 From 
                                                   
22  Estrada Marún, cit., pp. 95-96. 
23  Nevertheless, the constitutional judge renounced his post a year later, 
due to a serious traffic infraction. To replace him, the Government ap-
pointed as a new constitutional judge a public prosecutor that pos-
sessed a thirty-year-long service record. On the whole issue, see Es-
trada Marún, cit., pp. 131-139. 
24  The journalist Bonifacio de la Cuadra wrote in the daily newspaper 
El País of 26.1.1980 on the fear of a bipartisan appropriation of the 
Court (then by centrists and social-democrats) and pointed to the lack, 
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the perspective of guaranteeing the proper functioning and in-
dependence of the Court, four deficiencies in this regard can be 
pointed out:25 
a) First, the appropriation (or seizure) of the posts of constitu-
tional judges by the two main political parties. This is the princi-
pal criticism against the current appointment procedure.26 Alt-
hough the quorum for the nomination of constitutional judges in 
both legislative chambers is high enough to guarantee the 
broadest consensus on each individual appointment, the partial 
renovation system usually benefits only the two main political 
parties. When one of the two main political parties is strong 
enough (for instance, if it enjoys an absolute or two-thirds ma-
jority in the chamber), it tends to impose a 2-1-1 split, according 
to which it decides on the nomination of two judges, the main 
oppositional party a third one and the fourth is decided on by 
mutual agreement. In some exceptional cases, the two main 
political parties divide the total amount of posts to be appointed 
in half and allocate them to their partisans; both parties respect 
the choices of the other and vote together for the whole set. 
Since the first appointments in 1980 – when politicians were still 
inspired by the consensus prevailing in the constitutional debate 
– very rarely has an individual candidate been supported by 
                                                   
in the composition of the first Court, of specialists in federal and re-
gional studies. See Bonifacio de la Cuadra, Democracia de Papel 
(Madrid: Catarata 2015), pp. 32-33.  
25  For the gender issue in the appointment to the Constitutional Court, 
which does not affect the functioning or the independence of the Court 
itself but lies at the different – but not less important – level of parity 
democracy, see the constitutional amendment proposal by Octavio 
Salazar Benítez, ‘La deseable composición paritaria del Tribunal Con-
stitutional: una propuesta de reforma constitucional’, (2018) Revista 
de Derecho Político 101, 741-774.  
26  See Francisco Javier Matia Portilla, ‘La politización de las 
instituciones: mito y realidad’, (2010) El Cronista del Estado Social y 
Democrático de Derecho 13, 42. 
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more than the two main political parties.27 For only three ap-
pointments out of 63 has there been a specific agreement be-
tween one of the two main political parties and a third political 
party to appoint a candidate.28 Several suggestions have been 
put forward to supress or mitigate this quota system and make 
legal expertise prevail over political affinity. Generally, these 
suggestions consist of extending the length of the term of office 
(either a life term or until retirement) and/or of individual votes 
in Parliament for each candidate.29 Comparative law does not, 
however, offer magical receipts for avoiding the quota system 
                                                   
27  The candidacy of Jorge Rodríguez-Zapata Pérez received a total of 
198 votes and was jointly supported in the Senate by the parliamen-
tary groups of the People’s Party, the socialist party, Entesa Catalana 
de Progrès, CIU and Coalición Canaria. Similarly, some of the judges 
selected in 2010 by the Senate received the highest number of votes 
ever obtained in the history of the Senate (Adela Asua Batarrita, 226; 
Luis I. Ortega Álvarez, 223; Francisco Pérez de los Cobos Orihuel, 
221), since they were supported by the People’s Party, the Socialist 
Party, the mixed group and the Basque nationalists. It is one of the 
rare occasions in which the Basque nationalists have voted in favour 
of any candidate to the Constitutional Court. This has to do with the 
fact that the candidacy of Adela Asua Batarrita had been proposed by 
the Parliament of the Basque Country, even if it had been an initiative 
of the local section of the socialist party within the Parliament. See 
Estrada Marún, cit., pp. 232-234, 261-262. 
28  Carles Viver Pi-Sunyer (1992-2001), José Gabaldón López (in his 
second term: 1992-2001) and Encarna Roca Trias (2012-predictably 
2020) were appointed on the basis of agreements between the social-
ist party and the Catalonian nationalist party CIU; and Jesús Leguina 
Villa (1986-1992) was appointed with the support of both the Socialist 
Party and the Basque nationalists. See Estrada Marún, cit., pp. 181-
183, 205, 223, and 225. 
29  For a sophisticated amendment proposal, aiming at avoiding both 
deadlocks and blatant appropriation of posts by the two main political 
parties, see Rafael Naranjo de la Cruz, ‘Artículo 159 bis’, in Yolanda 
Gómez (ed.), Estudios sobre la reforma de la Constitución de 1978 
en su cuarenta aniversario (Cizur Menor: Aranzadi-Thomson Reuters 
2018), pp. 413-420. 
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in the selection of constitutional judges.30 Constitutional design 
does weigh heavily, but the issue boils down to one of political 
culture.  
b) Second, the lack of consideration of territorial diversity in ap-
pointments to the Constitutional Court.31 Although conflicts be-
tween the central government and the autonomous communi-
ties are numerous, and one of the main functions of the Court 
is precisely to adjudicate in those conflicts, autonomous com-
munities do not participate in the selection of constitutional 
judges, a task which falls to the four constitutional bodies that 
represent the three State functions corresponding to the central 
government (the two chambers of the Parliament, the Govern-
ment, and the General Council of the Judiciary). Certainly, on 
the one hand, this may appear coherent with the overall lack of 
representation of autonomous communities at the ‘federal’ level 
in Spain, one of the main differences of Spain’s decentralization 
model from some other federal systems, and with the ‘non-fed-
eral’ character of the Constitutional Court of Spain, but, on the 
other hand, it seems inadequate for the State to turn its back on 
regional sensitivity and expertise if the Constitutional Court 
wishes to strengthen its authority. By contrast, the Spanish 
Constitution of 1931 explicitly laid forth that each autonomous 
region could nominate a judge, even if only Catalonia benefited 
from this possibility as it was the only autonomous region prior 
to the civil war, and in the end, the experience has been 
                                                   
30  Pablo José Castillo Ortiz, ‘Guardar al Defensor de la Constitución’ – 
Sobre la independencia de la jurisdicción constitucional: evaluación 
de alternativas institucionales (Madrid: Fundación Alternativas 2012), 
p. 30. 
31  Jerónimo Arozamena Sierra, ‘Organización y funcionamiento del 
Tribunal Constitucional: balance de quince años’, in La jurisdicción 
constitucional en España – La Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucio-
nal: 1979-1994 (Madrid: Tribunal Constitucional-Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales 1995), p. 46. 
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deemed as negative, as the judge appointed by Catalonia acted 
more as a representative of the region than as a member of a 
court.  
In 2007, the procedure to nominee constitutional judges within 
the Senate was amended.32 Now, the Senate nominates its four 
judges from candidates proposed by the legislatures of the sev-
enteen autonomous communities; each regional assembly pro-
poses two candidates, and each candidate must go through a 
public hearing in the Senate.  
The impact of this innovation, which has only been put in prac-
tice twice (in 2010 and 2017), has been quite modest, and its 
future is uncertain. On the one hand, the selecting body, the 
Senate, does not represent the autonomous communities, 
since most of the senators are directly elected by the people on 
a province-district basis and only around one fifth are appointed 
by regional Parliaments. On the other hand, one of the two main 
State-wide political parties – the People’s Party – disagreed 
with the reform of the selection process, challenging the amend-
ment before the Constitutional Court, which declared the reform 
to be compatible with the Constitution, provided that it is under-
stood that the Senate is not bound by the proposals of the re-
gional Parliaments if it considers that their candidates are not 
appropriate.33 This interpretation saved the constitutionality of 
                                                   
32  The amendment consisting of not more than a handful of words was 
not carefully elaborated. In fact, the Government’s original proposal to 
amend the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court did not include it, 
but the Basque and Catalonian nationalist party groups (CIU, PNV 
and ERC) submitted to the Parliament propositions to guarantee that 
the Senate appoint candidates that would be sensitive to autonomous 
communities’ rights. 
33  Judgments 49/2008 and 101/2008. On these rulings, see Ignacio 
Torres Muro, ‘La reforma de la LOTC y del Reglamento del Senado, 
puesta a prueba’, (2008) Revista General de Derecho Constitucio-
nal 6; Juan Francisco de Asis Sánchez Barrilao, ‘La participación de 
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the amendment but downgraded the participation of autono-
mous communities in the procedure to nominate constitutional 
judges to a mere right to be consulted.34 Moreover, the People’s 
Party made regional assemblies, where it had strong represen-
tation, nominate the same two people to the Senate, disregard-
ing the spirit of the reform. This was possible as the regionali-
zation of the party system is still embryonic outside the more 
assertive of the autonomous communities. Regional politicians 
owe their position to the national party that appoints and sup-
ports them in the first place, and they are, therefore, subservient 
to the party’s needs and less able to promote and defend dis-
tinctive candidates to national institutions. In 2017, when the 
amended selection procedure was implemented for the second 
time, the socialist party also partially joined the People’s Party 
in its consolidation of candidates proposed by the regional as-
semblies. Consequentially, the Parliaments of Catalonia and 
the Basque Country refrained from proposing candidates to the 
Senate, as they considered that the leadership of the two main 
State-wide political parties had already decided on the selection 
of the four judges, even before they were heard in the Senate. 
Thus, they expressed their disagreement with the way the 
amendment to the selection process had been implemented. 
It is not a question of territorial representation, but of sensitivity 
to and expertise in the promotion of autonomy – and therefore, 
                                                   
las Comunidades Autónomas en la elección de los magistrados 
constitucionales’, (2009) Teoría y Realidad Constitucional 23, 
pp. 387-424; Patricia Rodríguez-Patrón, ‘El Tribunal Constitucional 
ante la reciente reforma de los artículos 16 de su Ley Orgánica y 184 
del Reglamento del Senado’, (2010) Revista de Derecho Político 77, 
pp. 107-140; and Joaquín Urías, ‘El Tribunal Constitucional ante la 
participación autonómica en el nombramiento de sus miembros’, 
(2010) Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals 10, pp. 207-244. In 
favour of the Court’s understanding, Lozano Miralles and Sac-
comanno, cit., pp. 294-296. 
34  For a thorough commentary, see Estrada Marún, cit., pp. 281-290.  
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of increasing the legitimacy of the ‘arbiter’ in territorial disputes. 
As a result of the design and implementation of the reform, only 
one of the four constitutional judges selected in 2010 by the 
Senate may be considered an expert in decentralisation, and 
only one other had her residence outside Madrid. Furthermore, 
in 2017, only one was an expert on federalism or autonomy, 
while three others had their residence in Madrid. More disturb-
ing still was the circumvention of the legal procedure for nomi-
nation in 2010 with no consequences to speak of, despite its 
implementation in accordance with the interpretation handed 
down by the Constitutional Court. One of the judges elected by 
the Senate had not been originally proposed by legislature of 
an autonomous community;35 the reason for his election was 
not that the Board of the Senate had considered, pursuant to 
Judgment 49/2008, that regional assemblies had not provided 
it with candidates qualified enough for the post but instead be-
cause the Senate had rejected the ‘first’ option presented by 
one of the two main political parties, and thus the leadership of 
that political party had decided to replace the regional candidate 
with a new one. 
c) Third, the increasing role of career judges in the Constitu-
tional Court.36 From the beginning, career judges have always 
been appointed to the Constitutional Court. Although it is not 
required to do so, the General Council of the Judiciary has al-
ways taken care to propose career judges to the Court. In the 
first Court, there were nine professors and three career judges. 
In 2002, after a premature replacement, the number of career 
judges rose to five. After the partial renovation of 2004, the 
Court was made up of seven career judges, one lawyer, and 
                                                   
35  Francisco Pérez de los Cobos Orihuel. 
36  In Spain, judges are generally recruited as a special kind of civil serv-
ant to serve in the judiciary through a competitive public exam and 
after completing legal training. 
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four professors. This was the longest Court, since two thirds of 
its composition were renovated much later than normal. Today, 
after the partial renovation of 2017, a similar proportion prevails: 
six career judges (former judges of the Supreme Court, four of 
them from the same administrative law chamber), a career pub-
lic prosecutor (a chief prosecutor at the Supreme Court), and 
five professors.  
It is not only the number, but also the relevance of career judges 
which has increased. For decades, all the presidents of the 
Court came originally from academia, even if professors were 
not in the majority. This was not based on any legal provision, 
but on tradition. The pattern changed in 2011, when a career 
judge – a former President of the Supreme Court – was elected 
by the constitutional judges as their President; the same oc-
curred in 2017 when, for the second time, another former judge 
of the Supreme Court was elected to become the President of 
the Constitutional Court.  
Both trends, the prevailing number of career judges and the 
presidency in the hands of a career judge, reinforce each other. 
They refer to a situation in which the Constitutional Court has 
surreptitiously ‘been captured’ by the more conservative Su-
preme Court. In 2011, the Court included two former Presidents 
of the Supreme Court; quite symbolically, until 2008 one of them 
was known for his disagreement with and criticism of the Con-
stitutional Court.37 Currently, the President and the Vice-Presi-
dent of the Court – which are, also, the Presidents of both 
Chambers of the Court – are career judges and hold the right to 
cast the deciding vote when there is a tie in plenary sessions 
and in chambers.  
                                                   
37  Francisco José Hernando Santiago, President of the Supreme Court 
(2001-2008) and judge of the Constitutional Court (2011-2013). 
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This development has had implications on the nature and scope 
of the Court’s review. First, constitutional judicial review may be 
conceived as a continuation of the judicial review in which ca-
reer judges are trained and, therefore, pieces of legislation chal-
lenged before the Court may be treated as administrative acts 
or rules. Second, many individual applications for the protection 
of fundamental rights challenge judicial decisions taken by the 
different Chambers of the Supreme Court, and former members 
of the Supreme Court may be deferent to the decisions of their 
colleagues still sitting on the bench. 
This development is possible because in Spain, unlike in Ger-
many or Italy, there is no limitation on the number of career 
judges sitting on the Constitutional Court, and because, unlike 
in Germany, the election of the President of the Court is a deci-
sion devolved to its own judges. 
d) Fourth, the lack of an age limitation for appointment to the 
Constitutional Court.38 Due to the lack of specific rules, it is up 
to the judges themselves to decide whether they are fully able 
to complete a full term. In the past, most of the premature ends 
to terms have been for age or health reasons. Nevertheless, in 
recent years the average age of constitutional judges when ap-
pointed has increased, and it is no exception that judges near 
or even over the age of 70 are appointed. This is fostered by 
the erroneous idea that appointment to the Constitutional Court 
is an honorific corollary for a distinguished legal career. In 2017, 
a record of sorts was broken in this regard; a 79-year-old law 
professor was appointed for a term of nine years. In Spain, 
judges of the Supreme Court must retire at the age of 72 and 
other judges as well as university professors at the age of 70. 
                                                   
38  Originally, this was a deliberate decision in order not to prevent the 
appointment of Manuel García Pelayo (1909-1991) to the Court. He 
was appointed in February 1980 at the age of seventy. 
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However, they are still eligible to be constitutional judges even 
if they are retired from the professional exercise that justifies 
their eligibility.39 The lack of age rules for the appointment or 
the retirement of constitutional judges is detrimental to the 
proper functioning of the Court, whose workload is extremely 
demanding. 
Moreover, since there is neither an age limitation nor any limi-
tation on the number of career judges, the political party sus-
taining the Government can use appointment to the Constitu-
tional Court to reward those judges of the Supreme Court – es-
pecially those serving as Presidents of the Supreme Court or of 
one of its Chambers – that prove deferent to government initia-
tives or judicial difficulties. The Supreme Court reviews the legal 
acts of the Government and the General Council of the Judici-
ary (through its Administrative Law Chamber), it adjudicates on 
suits to prohibit political parties at the behest of the Government 
or the public prosecutor (through the so-called Special Cham-
ber) and tries individuals with parliamentary immunity (through 
its Criminal Law Chamber).40 To avoid both dangers for the 
                                                   
39  For instance, Francisco José Hernando Santiago had already retired 
from the Supreme Court in 2008 at the age of 72 when in 2010 at the 
age of 74 he was appointed to the Constitutional Court; similarly, San-
tiago Martínez-Vares García had already retired from the Supreme 
Court in 2012 at the age of 72 when, a year later, he was appointed 
to the Constitutional Court. Professor Fernando Garrido Falla (1921-
2002) was appointed in February 1998 at the age of 76. 
40  Several former Presidents of the Supreme Court have been appointed 
to the Constitutional Court (Ángel Escudero del Corral, Jesús Delgado 
Barrio, Francisco José Hernando and Pascual Sala Sánchez), which 
represent four of the nine Presidents of the Supreme Court of the de-
mocracy. In most cases the appointments were decided formally 
within the General Council of the Judiciary (except in the case of 
Jesús Delgado Barrio). Certainly, the appointment to the Presidency 
of the Supreme Court also requires the agreement of the two main 
political parties within the General Council of the Judiciary. Neverthe-
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functioning and the independence of both the Constitutional 
Court and the Supreme Court, age rules either for appointment 
or for the retirement of constitutional judges should be adopted. 
The establishment of a fixed retirement age for constitutional 
judges would not be more of a disturbance to the partial reno-
vation cycle than the succession of unpredicted individual va-
cancies that inevitably, by virtue of death or premature resigna-
tions, already occur.41 
By contrast, election by the Government shows a consistent 
pattern of tactical acumen; the average age of constitutional 
judges elected by the Government is 52.42 As previously men-
tioned, by electing two constitutional judges every nine years, 
the Government has the prerogative to orient or reinforce the 
majority of the Court in the ideological direction of its choosing. 
From the existing data, it would seem that, to fully exploit this 
advantage, successive Governments have considered the age 
of candidates and have opted for middle-aged judges to guar-
                                                   
less, it would look more impartial and less confusing if the same indi-
viduals were not promoted to the top of the Supreme Court and later 
to the Constitutional Court. This is connected with the arguments 
above mentioned to avoid transforming the Constitutional Court in an 
extension of the Supreme Court. 
41  The following judges did not complete their terms: Menéndez y Men-
éndez (1980, resignation), Fernández Viagas (1982, death), Díez de 
Velasco (1985, resignation), García-Pelayo (1986, resignation), 
Truyol y Serra (1990, resignation), De los Mozos (1992, resignation), 
Delgado Barrio (1996, resignation), Ruiz Vadillo (1998, death), Gar-
rido Falla (2002, resignation), García-Calvo (2008, death), Hernando 
Santiago (2013, death), López López (2014, resignation), and Ortega 
Álvarez (2015, death). 
42  All male and mostly professors: 1980, Arozamena, 56 and Gómez-
Ferrer, 43; 1986, Rodríguez-Piñero, 51 and López Guerra, 39; 1995, 
Jiménez de Parga, 66 and Vives Antón, 55; 2004, Aragón Reyes, 60 
and Pérez Tremps, 47; 2013, González-Trevijano, 55 and López 
López, 50; 2014, Narváez Rodríguez, 56. 
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antee that their election will not be reversed through a prema-
ture end of term, and thereby, a vacancy that might be filled by 
a Government of another ideology. In fact, none of the Govern-
ment’s eleven appointments in almost forty years has prema-
turely ended his term due to death, age or health reasons.43 
2. The peculiar shortening and extension  
of the constitutional nine-year-term of office  
Further clarification is needed with regard to the time factor in 
appointments to the Constitutional Court. The Constitution 
clearly establishes that constitutional judges are appointed for 
nine-year, non-renewable terms, although special provisions 
were applied to the terms of the twelve judges appointed in 
1980.44 Nevertheless, the organic law of the Constitutional 
Court allows for a second full-term appointment if three years 
have elapsed after the expiration of the first appointment to the 
Court; in other words, the law forbids consecutive, but not dis-
continuous appointments.45 If judges could be reappointed for 
a new consecutive full term of nine years, their independence 
may appear compromised; they could be inclined to seek re-
appointment, and even if not, their opinions could still be under-
stood in this light. Therefore, the law only allows for discontinu-
ous appointment. In almost forty years, this possibility has never 
been exercised. Therefore, no serious discussion on the legiti-
macy and opportunity of this rule has ever occurred.46  
                                                   
43  The only case of a premature end of the term of office was a resigna-
tion due to a traffic incident.  
44  Ninth transitory provision to the Spanish Constitution. 
45  Art. 16(4) of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court. 
46  Eduardo Espín Templado, ‘Art. 16’, in J. L. Requejo Pagés (ed.), 
Comentarios a la Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucional (Madrid 
2011), p. 300. 
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However, strong criticism has been levelled with regard to the 
way in which the nine-year term may be shortened or extended 
in given circumstances: 
a) When there is a vacancy at the Court for reasons others than 
the expiration of term of office (death, resignation, incapacita-
tion, incompatibility etc.), the relevant selecting body shall pro-
pose to the King the appointment of a new judge to serve for 
the remaining time, that is, until the full set of four judges is re-
newed in due time. The new judge will always serve for a period 
of time inferior to nine years. Nevertheless, if a judge appointed 
to replace a judge that has died or resigned serves for less than 
three years, the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court allows 
the selecting body to propose the same judge for a new full term 
of nine years.47 These are the only situations in which a consti-
tutional judge may be appointed either for a period of less than 
nine years or for two consecutive periods amounting to almost 
twelve years. Both situations could be seen to be at odds with 
the nine-year term of office that the Constitution foresees.48 
Nevertheless, as a premature end to the term of constitutional 
judges may happen, the legislator had to give priority either to 
                                                   
47  Art. 16(4) of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court. In all cases 
in which a constitutional judge had been initially appointed for a period 
of time inferior to three years, he was later appointed for a new full 
term of nine years (García-Mon, 1989; Gabaldón, 1992; Enríquez 
Sancho, 2017; in all cases but one, by the same electing body. Pera 
Verdaguer was appointed to the Constitutional Court on 15 January 
1983; the partial renovation vote in the General Council of the Judici-
ary took place on 29 January 1986 when he had already exceeded 
the three years. For a thorough study of the rationality and practical 
implementation, not without difficulties, of the partial renovation sys-
tem see I. Borrajo Iniesta, ‘Renovarse o morir: el ritmo de las reno-
vaciones del Tribunal Constitucional español’, (2013) Revista General 
de Derecho Constitucional 16.  
48  Francisco Rubio Llorente, La forma del poder (Madrid 2012), vol. II, 
pp. 1398-1399; Estrada Marún, cit., p. 74. 
 28 
the strict application of the nine-year term of office or to the par-
tial renovation system, both of which being constitutionally en-
trenched. A systematic interpretation of the Constitution sup-
ports the legislator’s decision to give priority to the partial reno-
vation system within the described terms.49  
b) Confrontation between the two main political parties led to a 
serious case of political deadlock in the appointment of consti-
tutional judges. From February 2007 to July 2012, many of the 
constitutional judges continued to serve on the Court though 
their term had expired. For a number of weeks (from the 8 No-
vember 2010 to the end of January 2011), only a third of the 
judges’ terms had not expired. Thus, the partial renovation cycle 
of the Court was very much affected. In two steps, the legislator 
amended the law in an attempt to avoid part of the incentives 
for, and part of the consequences of, a deadlock. According to 
provisions established in 2007, the Presidency and Vice-Presi-
dency of the Court expire after three years, but in cases where 
the necessary partial renovation fails, they continue on until the 
renovation of four judges takes place and the new judges are 
sworn into office.50 The Court declared that this amendment 
was consistent with the Constitution.51 According to provisions 
established in 2010, the ordinary nine-year term of constitu-
tional judges replacing those with an expired term of office shall 
be shortened to match the delay in the renovation incurred by 
the selecting body.52 As a consequence, constitutional judges 
appointed in 2011 were replaced in 2017 after having served 
only six years. Thus, the judges appointed in 2012 should be 
                                                   
49  In this sense, Espín Templado, cit., p. 301-302. 
50  Art. 16(3) of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court, as amended 
by Organic Law no. 6/2007. 
51  Judgments 49/2008 and 101/2008. 
52  Art. 16(5) of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court, as amended 
by Organic Law no. 8/2010. 
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replaced in 2020 after having served approximately seven and 
a half years. These practices do not seem consistent with 
Art. 159(3) of the Constitution, which explicitly foresees a nine-
year term of office.53 
In both situations, the legislator’s sole concern seems to be the 
preservation of the partial renovation cycle every three years, 
as though it were the only constitutional key to the proper func-
tioning of the Court – which it is not nor should it be but instru-
mental – at the risk of downplaying the importance of the con-
stitutional provision which clearly stipulates nine-year terms. In-
stead of remedying the causes or the consequences of political 
deadlock, the new provisions have paradoxically legalised non-
compliance with the legislative chambers’ constitutional duty to 
provide renovation of the Court in due time and have shifted the 
consequences of political deadlock to the length of term of office 
of constitutional judges. Legal scholarship has proposed sev-
eral solutions to bypass political deadlocks after a reasonable 
delay has elapsed: lowering the majority required for election, 
co-option of constitutional judges, the King’s right to propose 
candidates to the selecting bodies, appointment by or of consti-
tutional judges emeriti, appointment by other social organisa-
tions, etc.54 
                                                   
53  The amendment has been the object of sharp criticism: see, for 
instance, Luis Pomed Sánchez, ‘Prólogo’ to J. A. Estrada Marún, La 
designación de los magistrados del Tribunal Constitucional en 
España. Una perspectiva orgánica y empírica (Cizur Menor: 
Aranzadi-Thomson Reuters 2017), p. 37: ‘Organic Law no. 8/2010 
does not correspond with a democracy that is almost four decades 
old’. An elaborated criticism in Estrada Marún, cit., pp. 259, 339-343. 
54  Reform proposals are numerous. Among them, see Susana García 
Couso, ‘Cómo superar la lógica del estado de partidos en el Tribunal 
Constitucional: la reforma del artículo 159’, (2012) Teoría y Realidad 
Constitucional 29, 433-456; Germán Fernández Farreres, ‘Sobre la 
designación de los magistrados constitucionales: una propuesta de 
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3. Status of independence 
Constitutional provisions explicitly protect the independence of 
members of the Constitutional Court; membership of the Con-
stitutional Court is incompatible with any representative func-
tion, any political or administrative office, a management role in 
a political party or trade union or any employment in their ser-
vice, a career as a judge or prosecutor, and any professional or 
commercial activity whatsoever; the incompatibilities related to 
the members of the Judiciary are also applicable to the mem-
bers of the Constitutional Court, and judges of the Constitutional 
Court are independent and irremovable during their term of of-
fice.55 It is the Court itself who declares the end of term of con-
stitutional judges.56 In almost forty years of operation, the mem-
bers of the Court have not had any problems with these provi-
sions.  
Beyond the entrenched incompatibilities, selecting bodies tend 
to avoid appointing to the Constitutional Court individuals that 
have in the past had relevant political, governmental or ministe-
rial responsibilities. For instance, out of 63 constitutional judges 
appointed up until 2019 none had previously been a member of 
the State or a regional government in the constitutional period,57 
                                                   
reforma constitucional’ (2015) Revista Española de Derecho 
Constitucional 105, 13-49; Estrada Marún, cit., pp. 352-370. 
55  Art. 159 (4) and (5) of the Constitution. 
56  Art. 23 of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court. 
57  The exceptions are, in any case, quite distant in the past: first, Plácido 
Fernández Viagas, appointed as a constitutional judge in 1980 by the 
General Council of the Judiciary, had been the Chairman of the polit-
ical-representative body preparing the autonomous community of An-
dalucía (1978-1979) before joining the General Council; second, Au-
relio Menéndez, appointed as a constitutional judge in 1980 and at the 
same time as the preferred candidate of the governing party to be the 
President of the Court, had been Minister of Education between 1976-
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and only a handful had been members of the State Parliament, 
mostly only senators during the drafting of the Constitution.58 
Controversy arose in July 2013 when, immediately after the 
election of a new President of the Court,59 it was revealed that 
he had been member of a political party until shortly prior to his 
election, including during the previous three years of service at 
the Court; said controversy should be understood in that the 
general public strongly believes that membership to a political 
party is incompatible with the status of a constitutional judge. 
However, as previously indicated, the Constitution does not for-
bid ordinary membership, only a management role in a political 
party. Therefore, a formal request to the Court to exclude the 
participation of its President from proceedings concerning 
Catalonia was rejected on September 2013, with widespread 
incomprehension from the general public.60 Some scholars pro-
pose to amend Article 159 of the Constitution to exclude even 
the membership to any political party or trade union by consti-
tutional judges.61 
                                                   
1977 – he immediately resigned, however, from the constitutional of-
fice as his colleagues opted to elect another judge as their President 
–; and third, Manuel Jiménez de Parga, appointed as a constitutional 
judge in 1995, had been Minister of Labour between 1977-1978. 
58  Only the law professor Andrés Ollero Tassara, appointed in 2012 to 
the Constitutional Court, had been before a member of the Parliament 
for seventeen years (1986-2003). 
59  Francisco Pérez de los Cobos Orihuel. 
60  Order 180/2013. See Francisco Javier Matia Portilla, ‘Sobre la 
adscripción partidaria de los magistrados del Tribunal Constitucional 
y su invocación en el proceso’, (2014) Teoría y Realidad Constitucio-
nal 34, pp. 235-268. 
61  Naranjo de la Cruz and González Represa, cit., pp. 411-412. 
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Other measures to guarantee the independence of the Court 
include: immunity of constitutional judges for opinions ex-
pressed in the exercise of their functions,62 criminal protection 
against defamation, libel or threats by third persons,63 the fact 
that the Supreme Court is the legal venue to try constitutional 
judges,64 the power to approve and manage the Court’s 
budget,65 and the power to pass rules on its own functioning 
and organisation and on the statute of its staff.66 
                                                   
62  Art. 22 of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court. See Clara 
Viana Ballester, ‘La no reforma de la inviolabilidad de los Magistrados 
del Tribunal Constitucional mediante LO 6/2007’, in Constitución, 
derechos fundamentales y sistema penal (Semblanzas y estudios con 
motivo del setenta aniversario del profesor Tomás Salvador Vives 
Antón), t. II (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch 2009), pp. 1973-1987. 
63  Art. 504 of the Criminal Code. 
64  Art. 57(2) of the Organic Law of the Judiciary. 
65  Second Additional Provision of the Organic Law on the Constitutional 
Court. See Lozano Miralles and Saccomanno, cit., pp. 216-220. 
66  Art. 2 (2) of the Organic law on the Constitutional Court.  
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III. Challenges to the functioning  
and independence of the Constitutional Court 
Three kinds of challenges to the proper functioning and inde-
pendence of the Constitutional Court can be discerned in its 
forty-year existence: pressure from the three branches of gov-
ernment, from political parties, and from territorial powers. Each 
of these challenges is of different intensity and impact. The next 
few sections will analyse them from the least to the most serious 
interferences.  
1. Challenges from three branches of government 
Tension between the Court and State powers is to some extent 
inevitable. Understandably, a public authority whose act is an-
nulled tends to dislike the judgment handed down by the Court. 
This is especially the case when the Spanish Government sees 
one of its emblematic legislative initiatives annulled. For in-
stance, Judgment 341/1993 declared unconstitutional the law 
which gave power to the police to enter a place of residence 
without a warrant when a crime is believed to be being perpe-
trated. The Minister that proposed the legislation resigned im-
mediately following this decision. 
On occasion, the Court has adopted a moralizing tone, remind-
ing public powers that they owe loyalty to the Constitution and 
affirming the need to correct anomalous situations in which the 
central state continues exercising powers that belong to the au-
tonomous communities.67 
                                                   
67  See, for instance, Judgments 208/1999 and 95/2016. 
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Nevertheless, neither the central government nor the legislature 
has ever reacted with unconstitutional measures or with at-
tempts to weaken the Court or its powers. There has never been 
a case of the re-passing of legal provisions already ruled un-
constitutional and void by the Court. The Court can generally 
count on a responsive legislature, which, when asked to amend 
or replace unconstitutional legislation, responds within a rea-
sonable time.68 Last but not least, the constitutional amendment 
has never been used as a way of side-stepping a Court ruling, 
as in other European countries.69 
                                                   
68  In 1999, the Court held unconstitutional the centralisation of adminis-
trative powers for the protection of competition and called on the leg-
islature to regulate the decentralisation and co-ordination of adminis-
trative powers in this area (Judgment 208/1999); in 2002, the legisla-
ture passed an act establishing said principles. In 2012, the Court held 
unconstitutional the centralisation of powers concerning the manage-
ment of railroads and called on the legislature to specify which rail-
roads are of the national interest and should remain with the central 
state’s competence and which should not and should be transferred 
to the autonomous communities (Judgment 245/2012). Formal com-
pliance with the judgment was endorsed first by the government, 
which urgently passed a provisional scheme in just two months, and, 
later, by the legislature with a definitive scheme in 2013. Nevertheless, 
new controversies arose with regard to the decisions made by the 
central state. 
69  For instance, Art. 53(1) of the French Constitution was amended to 
bypass décision 93-325 of 13 August 1993 of the Conseil Constitu-
tionnel, on the Aliens Act limiting aliens’ rights. Constitutional 
amendments to overcome, or even to prevent nullifying judgments of 
the Constitutional Court, are not rare in Austria: Heinz Schäffer, ‘La 
relación entre el Tribunal Constitucional y el legislador’, in E. Aja (ed.), 
Las tensiones entre el Tribunal Constitucional y el legislador en la 
Europa actual (Barcelona: Ariel 1998), 40-42. 
 35 
By contrast, clashes with the Supreme Court have been rela-
tively frequent in the first twenty-five years (1981-2007), espe-
cially with its Civil and Criminal Law Chambers.70 The Supreme 
Court’s Criminal Law Chamber explicitly rejected rulings by the 
Constitutional Court concerning the interpretation of time limita-
tions for criminal responsibility,71 since the former considered 
that the latter had invaded its competence on the interpretation 
of legality. For that same reason, the Supreme Court’s Civil Law 
Chamber became irritated by the Constitutional Court’s rulings 
on cases dealing with the investigation of paternity72 and on a 
celebrity’s honour.73 Conflict with the Supreme Court reached a 
head when in January 2004 it declared a civil suit against each 
                                                   
70  Rosario Serra Cristóbal, La guerra de las cortes: la revisión de la 
jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo a través del recurso de amparo 
(Madrid: Tecnos 1999); Pedro Cruz Villalón, ‘Conflict between 
Tribunal Constitucional and Tribunal Supremo – a national 
experience’, in The future of European judicial system in a 
comparative perspective (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2006), 111-116; 
Leslie Turano, ‘Spain: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?: The Struggle 
for Jurisdiction Between the Tribunal Constitutional and the Tribunal 
Supremo’, (2006) 1 International Journal for Constitutional Law 1, 
pp. 151-162; Luis E. Delgado del Rincón, ‘El principio de primacía del 
Tribunal Constitucional en materia de garantías constitucionales: su 
cuestionamiento por la Sala Primera del Tribunal Supremo’, en 
P. Pérez Tremps (ed.), La reforma del Tribunal Constitucional – Actas 
del V Congreso de la Asociación de Constitucionalistas de España 
(Valencia: Tirant lo Blanc 2007), pp. 633-670; Cornelia Hansen, 
‘Guerra de Cortes’: der Konflikt zwischen dem Spanischen 
Verfassungsgericht und dem Spanischen Obersten Gericht 
(Hamburgo: Dr. Kovac 2008); Rafael Mendizabal Allende, La guerra 
de los jueces: Tribunal Supremo vs. Tribunal Constitucional (Madrid: 
Dykinson 2012). 
71  See, for instance, Judgments 63/2005, 138/2016, and 22/2017. 
72  Judgment 7/1994. The judges of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme 
Court even considered the possibility of submitting a protest to the 
King. See Bonifacio de la Cuadra, Democracia de papel (Madrid: 
Catarata 2015), p. 33. 
73  Judgments 115/2000 and 186/2001. 
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of the twelve constitutional judges for professional negligence. 
The Supreme Court considered that the Constitutional Court 
had not reasoned its decision to not admit an extravagant indi-
vidual complaint based on the merits of the case; the complaint 
was directed ‘to the Constitutional Court replaced by a compo-
sition that would guarantee an impartial assessment,’ and it re-
quested the recusal of all of the constitutional judges and the 
elaboration by the Parliament of a new law providing a new 
Constitutional Court. The constitutional judges were obliged to 
compensate for damages. Instead of worsening the conflict, 
they paid the compensation and submitted individual constitu-
tional complaints against the Judgment before the Constitu-
tional Court. The case remained undecided until, more than 
nine years after the submission of their constitutional complaint, 
a fully-renewed Constitutional Court could address it. In Judg-
ment 133/2013, the Constitutional Court stated that no Spanish 
court could review its rulings and annulled the Supreme Court’s 
ruling imposing compensation for damages. In light of the Su-
preme Court ruling against the constitutional judges, Art. 4 of 
the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court was amended in 
2007 to make clear that no court of the State may review deci-
sions of the Constitutional Court and that the Court may take all 
necessary measures to preserve its jurisdiction, including ex of-
ficio declaration of the nullity of acts or decisions that undermine 
it. 
2. Challenges from political parties 
The Constitutional Court’s first years of functioning were, for 
some, a sort of golden age in terms of independence; ‘the first 
constitutional judges were the most independent and capable 
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in the history of the institution.’74 Two examples of this golden 
age must be mentioned. First, in 1980 the judges did not elect 
as their President the candidate already ‘decided’ by the two 
main political parties, the commercial law professor Aurelio 
Menéndez who had been Minister of Education during the tran-
sition to democracy, but, symbolically, the seventy-year-old 
constitutional law professor Manuel García-Pelayo who had de-
fended the Republic as a young officer and had later taught con-
stitutional law in Puerto Rico and Venezuela.75 Second, in 1982 
the two then-main political parties agreed to enact a harmonis-
ing law according to Article 150(3) of the Constitution to regulate 
the process of decentralisation. Simply put, they attempted to 
impose a uniform model for the developing system of devolution 
of powers. Suits against the law were brought by the Basque 
Country and Catalonia. In a hard-hitting ruling, the Constitu-
tional Court unanimously declared that preventive harmoniza-
tion of the rule-making provisions of the newly born or to-be-
created autonomous communities was not compatible with the 
Constitution.76  
Nevertheless, even capable judges must cope with challenges 
to their independence. The first challenge to the Court’s inde-
pendence happened at the very beginning; by virtue of transi-
tory provisions of the Constitution, four of the judges of the Con-
stitutional Court had to be replaced in 1983, in order to establish 
the partial renovation cycle every three years; nevertheless, 
they could be exceptionally re-appointed for another full term. 
Those four judges had been part of the broad consensus be-
tween centrists (the then-governing party) and socialists (the 
                                                   
74  Bonifacio de la Cuadra, Democracia de papel (Madrid: Catarata 
2015), p. 32. He insists that, at that time, the Court was not yet mort-
gaged by political parties, but by the Constitution it had to interpret. 
75  Estrada Marún, cit., p. 57. 
76  Judgment 76/1983. 
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then-main opposition party) to elect the first ten judges by both 
the Parliament and the Government in 1980. In fact, after win-
ning the 1982 general election with an absolute majority (202 
seats out of 350) the governing socialist party made it clear that 
it only wished to re-appoint two of them, apparently, because 
the other two were politically less trust-worthy.77 By contrast, 
the opposition conservative party preferred to either maintain all 
of them or to appoint four new judges. For seven months, polit-
ical forces discussed whether to re-appoint the judges or not. 
Here, the idea that the composition of the Court should reflect 
the political composition of the Parliament emerged for the first 
time. In the meanwhile, the Court continued business as usual 
and, for instance, unanimously ruled on the preventive harmo-
nisation of the autonomy process. In the end, the four judges 
whose term of office had expired were re-elected, a decision 
which reinforced the authority of the Court.78 If in those inaugu-
ral years these judges had been chastened for their legal opin-
ions, the political message would have been devastating. Pres-
sure on judges by political parties in politically disputed cases, 
however, has not been entirely averted in those years, as 
demonstrated the review of a Government’s controversial ex-
propriation of a firm79 or, years later, the review of abortion leg-
islation.80 Both cases were decided with the President of the 
Court casting the deciding vote.81  
                                                   
77  Professors Francisco Rubio Llorente and Antonio Truyol y Serra. 
78  See Estrada Marún, cit., pp. 169-173. 
79  Judgment 111/1983. The Plenary of the ECtHR declared in Ruiz-
Mateos v. Spain (Judgment of 23 June 1993, application 
no. 12952/87) that there had been a violation of Art. 6(1) CEDH “as 
regards the fairness of the proceedings conducted in this case in the 
Constitutional Court”.  
80  Judgment 53/1985. 
81  This brought about rough media campaigns against the then Presi-
dent, Manuel García-Pelayo, which went on even after his premature 
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Spanish constitutional jurisdiction shows a degree of politicisa-
tion similar to that of other constitutional jurisdictions, since 
complete independence from politics cannot, by definition, be 
fully achieved. First, all constitutional judges are selected by po-
litical institutions, which are controlled by the main political 
forces of the time, political affinity being a relevant aspect of 
their selection. Legislative chambers are no longer the fora to 
discuss the subjective requirements and skills of the candi-
dates. Few people outside the selecting body carry negotiations 
on the appointments to the Constitutional Court, and some-
times, as it happened in 2001, it is part and parcel of broader 
political bargaining between the two main political forces that 
includes other constitutional institutions. Second, constitutional 
judges presently make up two clusters, socialist or conserva-
tive, in the sense that they concur more often with judges of the 
same cluster than those of the other. Third, internal tension 
within a Constitutional Court and public controversy with regard 
to judgments with political implications are inevitable. Peaks of 
tension and controversy are sometimes reached in constitu-
tional jurisdictions. Nevertheless, an empirical study on consti-
tutional judicial review voting in the Spanish Constitutional 
Court for a period of twenty years (1980-2001) concludes that 
‘party alignment exists but is subject to complex incentives and 
institutional influences’, and that ideology is ‘subject to institu-
tional restrictions that favour frequent unanimous decisions’.82  
All the same, there is a perception that the degree of politicisa-
tion of the Spanish Constitutional Court has deteriorated in the 
                                                   
resignation in 1986. See Rubio Llorente, La forma del poder (Madrid 
2012), vol. I, p. 432. 
82  Nuno Garoupa, Fernando Gómez-Pomar and Veronica Grembi, 
‘Judging under Political Pressure: An Empirical Analysis of Constitu-
tional Review Voting in the Spanish Constitutional Court’, Illinois Law, 
Behavior and Social Science Research Paper Series, Nr. LBSS11-22 
(University of Illinois, College of Law), May 2011, p. 17. 
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last decade,83 with a majority of scholars pointing to the consti-
tutional adjudication on Catalonia’s autonomy statute of 2006 
as the turning point.84 Strictly speaking, the phenomenon is not 
about the party preferences of constitutional judges, but about 
the instrumentalisation of constitutional jurisdiction by the main 
political parties.85 There is no easy solution to brutal instrumen-
talisation. 
Two basic events have made the appearance of politicisation 
more visible to citizens: the stormy proceedings of the constitu-
tional appeal against the statute of autonomy of Catalonia 
(2006-2010) and the three-year political deadlock to renew the 
Constitutional Court (2007-2010). When the polarisation of po-
litical life reaches a climax, as occurred in those cases, the func-
tioning of the Constitutional Court is one of the collateral victims. 
The struggle over appointments and the crossover recusal of 
constitutional judges at the behest of the two main political par-
ties made the Constitutional Court internally more fragile and 
externally more vulnerable to accusations of political bias. 
Between 2006 and 2010, the atmosphere both inside and out-
side the Court was tense. To understand the intensity of the 
political confrontation, it must be, first, noted that the governing 
conservative People’s Party had just unexpectedly lost the gen-
                                                   
83  Castillo Ortiz, cit., p. 14.  
84  In this sense, Octavio Salazar Benítez, ‘El nombramiento de los mag-
istrados y las magistradas del Tribunal Constitucional: ingeniería ju-
rídica vs cultura política”, in Alejandro Villanueva Turnes (ed.), El Tri-
bunal Constitucional español (Tébar Flores 2017), p. 28; J.-B. Hargu-
indéguy, G. Sola Rodríguez and J. Cruz Díaz, ‘Between justice and 
politics: the role of the Spanish Constitutional Court in the state of au-
tonomies’, (2018) Territory, Politics, Governance, p. 10: ‘The politici-
zation of the court with respect to the ruling about the statute of Cata-
lonia damaged the reputation for impartiality of the court’. 
85  Harguindéguy, Sola Rodríguez and Cruz Díaz, cit., p. 15. 
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eral elections of 14 March 2004, after having run the Govern-
ment for the previous eight years. A few days prior to said elec-
tions a terrorist attack on a Madrid railway killed near two hun-
dred people. The central government insisted from the very be-
ginning that it had been carried out by a Basque terrorist organ-
ization, though evidence was lacking and the attack did not fit 
the pattern of attacks carried out by that organization. For years 
after, some members of the People’s Party and of the media fed 
the paranoid belief that it had been a conspiracy by State secu-
rity services. With the unforeseen loss of the 2004 general elec-
tion, the People’s Party also lost the chance to elect two judges 
to the Constitutional Court, in the Government’s turn, to replace 
those ending their term of office on 8 April 2004. 
Second, the socialist party in Catalonia had allied itself with na-
tionalist parties to govern the regional government with the 
promise of broadening devolution through a new statute of au-
tonomy, a measure the conservative party strongly opposed. 
The statute of autonomy of Catalonia was approved in the Par-
liaments of Catalonia and Spain and later by the Catalonian 
people by referendum in June 2006. To be sure, the text ap-
proved by 90 % of the members of the Parliament of Catalonia 
was quite different from the text approved later by the Parlia-
ment of Spain and the people of Catalonia, to the extent that 
one of the two Catalonian nationalist parties rescinded its sup-
port to its ratification in the referendum. While the conservative 
party had (and has) relatively little support in Catalonia, it is, 
however, one of the two main State-wide political parties, along 
with the socialist party. Even if the Catalonian statute of auton-
omy had been approved by the Spanish Parliament and by the 
people of Catalonia in a referendum, it lacked the support of the 
conservative party. 
Even before the statute of autonomy of Catalonia was passed, 
the conservative party had already begun a massive campaign 
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against it, obviously expecting big electoral gains in other re-
gions of Spain. The campaign included popular agitation, such 
as the collection of signatures against its approval and calling 
for a boycott against Catalonian products. When the statute was 
finally passed, the conservative party challenged it before the 
Constitutional Court. More than two hundred provisions were 
entirely or partially questioned. The conservative party even 
challenged provisions identical to those in the statutes of auton-
omy of other autonomous communities that it had endorsed. 
Certainly, more than a handful of provisions were questionable 
from a strict constitutional perspective, but there was no prece-
dent for such a massive challenge against a statute of auton-
omy (which must be approved by the Parliament of Spain and 
in some cases, like in Catalonia, ratified by the electorate). Very 
symbolically, it also included a constitutional complaint against 
the definition of Catalonia as a national entity included in the 
preamble of the statute. 
When proceedings before the Constitutional Court began, there 
was a succession of externally driven disruptions to the func-
tioning of the Court. Said disturbances included direct and indi-
rect attempts to condition judges’ work and to alter the majority 
of the Court including requests for recusal of judges, aggressive 
press campaigns, leaks to the media of draft rulings, up to three-
year-long delays to renew judges and legal amendments to 
keep the Presidency of the Court unaltered during the political 
deadlock. 
The first struggle came about through constitutional appeals 
submitted by members of the Parliament belonging to the Peo-
ple’s Party against amendments to the Organic Law of the Con-
stitutional Court of 2007 and subsequent amendments to the 
Rules of the Senate. Those amendments aimed at offering the 
right to propose candidates to the Constitutional Court before 
the Senate to the assemblies of the autonomous communities 
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and at keeping the Presidency and Vice-presidency of the Court 
unaltered while the partial renovation of the Court was delayed 
or in a deadlock. The proceedings of said constitutional appeals 
were extremely tense.86 
First of all, in a letter, two constitutional judges requested that 
the President and Vice-President of the Court resign, allegedly 
for the content of the amendment itself and for the explanation 
given by them – an unprecedented step in and of itself. Second, 
the President and Vice-President of the Court abstained from 
adjudicating on the constitutionality of a provision that affected 
them. Third, five crossfire requests for recusal of constitutional 
judges were submitted: one by the Government against two 
judges, and the other by the applicants against three different 
judges. The recusals were not grounded on the individual lack 
of impartiality of the affected judges, but on their ideological or 
partisan adscription. The Court rejected the request for recusal 
against the three judges and accepted the recusals against the 
two judges that had asked for the resignation of the President 
and Vice-President.87 As a consequence, the Court adjudicated 
on the constitutionality of the controverted amendments of such 
a relevant piece of legislation with only eight judges, the mini-
mum quorum for the Court.88 By a majority of five judges to 
three, it ruled that the amendments were constitutional.89 The 
minority submitted tough dissenting opinions. 
As far as the central struggle is concerned – the appeal of the 
statute of autonomy of Catalonia –, the final decision was ren-
dered on 28 June 2010 by only ten judges, since one of them 
                                                   
86  See Estrada Marún, cit., pp. 281-290. 
87  Orders 443/2007 and 81/2008. 
88  Art. 14 of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court. 
89  Judgment 49/2008. 
 44 
had been successfully recused90 and other had passed away, 
not being replaced until 2012. Of the ten sitting judges, the term 
of office of four of them had long expired, since political dead-
lock had blocked the appointment process until the Constitu-
tional Court could hand down its pending decision on the statute 
of autonomy of Catalonia. The Court did not start to return to 
normal until Judgment 31/2010 on the Catalonian statute was 
delivered, and four new judges were finally appointed after a 
delay of more than three years. They were finally sworn into 
office in January 2011. 
In the meanwhile, the terms of office of four other judges had 
also expired. In June 2011, when the delay to appoint their suc-
cessors had reached seven months, the affected judges ten-
dered their resignation, which was ultimately rejected by the 
President of the Court to guarantee the continuity and stability 
of the institution.91 In May 2012, however, it was the Court itself 
which, in a press note, insistently reminded of the constitutional 
duty to renew the Court on time and warned it would take steps, 
‘however drastic’, to remedy the situation.92 Finally, after a 
twenty-month delay, new constitutional judges were appointed 
in July 2012.93 
Still, in June 2012 tensions again reached a peak – complete 
with press campaigns against constitutional judges – when the 
Court, by a slim majority of 6 to 5, allowed a hitherto forbidden 
                                                   
90  Order 26/2007, with regard to Pablo Pérez Tremps. On this Order, 
see Luis E. Delgado del Rincón, ‘La recusación de los magistrados 
del Tribunal Constitucional (comentario al ATC 26/2007, de 5 de 
febrero)’, (2008) Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional 28, 
pp. 347-394. 
91  Estrada Marún, cit., pp. 201-202. 
92  Estrada Marún, cit., pp. 202-203. 
93  In fact, one of these appointments corresponded to the vacancy left 
by the death of Roberto García-Calvo Montiel in May 2008, which was 
therefore filled after a delay of four years and two months. 
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Basque political party to take part in elections and annulled the 
prohibition by the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court.94 In 
press declarations, one regional President in the conservative 
party harshly attacked the judge-rapporteur accusing her of ma-
nipulating the assignment of cases and of drafting a judgment 
of poor quality. She even asked for the transformation of the 
Constitutional Court into a chamber of the Supreme Court, a 
court that would be closer ideologically to the conservatives.95  
This was the starting point for a populist outcry that has ap-
pealed to certain groups. Since then, other leading politicians 
from the centre-liberal party Ciudadanos96 have called for the 
elimination of the Constitutional Court from time to time. The 
emergent right-wing extremist party Vox has even formally in-
cluded this proposal in its party programme. They convolutedly 
argue that the Court is politicised, in as far as its members are 
appointed by political parties and it amends the decisions of 
both the judiciary and the legislature despite not belonging to 
either. Nevertheless, as previously argued, the Constitutional 
Court is increasingly ‘being captured’ by the Supreme Court; 
this may be an indirect way of pursuing the transformation of 
the former into an extension of the latter. 
3. Challenges from the territorial powers:  
two kinds of confrontation  
National and territorial authorities have presented many clashes 
of jurisdiction to be adjudicated by the Constitutional Court. Two 
                                                   
94  Judgment 138/2012. 
95  El País, 21 June 2012. https://elpais.com/politica/2012/06/21/ 
actualidad/1340288816_772549.html. 
96  Albert Rivera and Juan Carlos Girauta. See El Mundo, 20 August 
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different kinds of clashes can be discerned: the ‘ordinary’ con-
frontation between national and territorial authorities about the 
interpretation of the Constitution on the extension of compe-
tences and powers that it is inevitable in any complex, multilevel 
polity, on the one hand, and the ‘extraordinary’ confrontation in 
which it is the supreme rule of the State itself which is rejected, 
on the other. The first type of confrontation may lead to contra-
ventions, but a Constitutional Court should generally be able to 
solve them. By contrast, it is a much more difficult task for a 
Constitutional Court to address a direct challenge to its authority 
or the base of it, the normativity of the Constitution. The Consti-
tutional Court raised the point in Judgment 259/2015 (legal 
ground no. 6) and repeated it in Judgment 114/2017 (legal 
ground no. 5): 
This violation of the Constitution is not, as is usually the case 
with contraventions of our fundamental rule, the result of a 
misunderstanding of what the Constitution imposes or allows 
in a given circumstance, but rather the result of an outright 
rejection of the binding power of the Constitution itself, which 
has been expressly set at odds with a power claiming to hold 
sovereignty and to constitute the expression of a constituent 
dimension from which a blatant repudiation of the current 
constitutional system has taken place. This is an affirmation 
by an authority with pretensions of founding a new political 
order, and for that very reason, of being released from all 
legal ties. 
This may not be a rhetorical distinction at all. Judgment 
114/2017 argued that legal acts expressing an outright rejection 
of the binding power of the Constitution itself could not claim for 
themselves the presumption of constitutionality which generally 
accompanies any legislative act (legal grounds no. 2 and 5). 
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Both types of confrontation are not exclusionary: while the Con-
stitutional Court was quashing declarations of sovereignty or in-
dependence or laws preparing for it, ordinary business went on 
in parallel at the Court and ordinary conflicts of power were 
solved, in many occasions, in favour of Catalonian institutions.97 
This confirms the above-mentioned conclusion that constitu-
tional judges are restrained by factors other than party or ideo-
logical alignment (such as precedent, lack of discretion, dissent 
aversion, etc.), and that sometimes there is no room for them to 
reflect their political preferences in their decisions, even in dire 
circumstances. 
a) The ‘ordinary confrontation’: the Basque Country as 
the primary agent 
The relationship between the Constitutional Court and espe-
cially assertive autonomous communities, like the Basque 
Country or Catalonia, has never been easy.  
One of the reasons for the speedy set up of the Constitutional 
Court in 1980 was the passing of the first two statutes of auton-
omy, those of the Basque Country and Catalonia, in 1979. From 
the very beginning, there was an awareness that adjudication 
through the Court would be very much required.98 The Spanish 
decentralisation model, or ‘state of autonomies,’ is so open-
ended that too much was devolved to the political process itself, 
                                                   
97  This was the case, for the last four years, of Judgments 25/2015, 
61/2015, 85/2015, 7/2016, 18/2016, 20/2016, 87/2016, 95/2016, 
120/2016, 9/2017, 34/2017, 53/2017, 54/2017, 68/2017, 79/2017, 
81/2017, 110/2017, 152/2017, 14/2018, 15/2018, 30/2018, 33/2018, 
55/2018, 62/2018, 64/2018, 69/2018, 71/2018, 88/2018 and 
132/2018. 
98  Bonifacio de la Cuadra wrote in El País of 30 December 1979 on the 
‘urgent need of the constitutional arbiter’. See Bonifacio de la Cuadra, 
Democracia de papel (Madrid: Catarata 2015), p. 32. 
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with all the advantages and disadvantages that come along with 
it. The Constitutional Court has contributed enormously to the 
implementation and rationalisation of that process and, lastly, 
to the definition of the ‘state of autonomies’.99 Nevertheless, 
some autonomous communities, especially the Basque Coun-
try and Catalonia, do not accept the low-level decentralisation 
that the main State-wide political parties have come to endorse; 
they demand the effectiveness of devolution and the strict ob-
servance of all powers constitutionally entrenched to them. Ad-
ditionally, cultural, educational and linguistic issues provide for 
further occasions for centre-periphery quarrels. All these factors 
together ‘guarantee’ an immense number of competence and 
territorial conflicts. 
Even if they are committed to making federalism work, consti-
tutional, supreme and supranational courts promote centralisa-
tion more than the autonomy of the relevant constituent 
parts.100 This is understandable and, to some extent, unavoid-
able in all kinds of polities, even more so in traditionally unitary 
ones. Nonetheless, in comparative terms it is unique to the 
Spanish model that autonomous communities do not take a rel-
evant part in the appointment of members of the body that ad-
                                                   
99  See Ignacio Borrajo Iniesta, ‘Adjudicating in Divisions of Powers: the 
Experience of the Spanish Constitutional Court’, in A. Le Sueur (ed.), 
Building the UK’s New Supreme Court. National and Comparative 
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), pp. 145-72. 
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ibidem, pp. 367-403; and J. López-Laborda, F. Rodrigo and E. Sanz-
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judicates on centre-periphery disputes. It is crucial that the com-
position of the Constitutional Court reflect the interests and wor-
ries of the Spanish nationalities and regions, through the sensi-
tivity and legal expertise of the constitutional judges, for a num-
ber of reasons (lack of participation of autonomous communi-
ties in federal legislation, lack of political and legal safeguards 
for autonomous communities other than the constitutional juris-
diction itself, the high number of competence disputes between 
the State and autonomous communities). 
With regard to these general considerations, it may, perhaps, 
not be surprising that Basque institutions decided at some point 
not to challenge any more legal State acts before the Constitu-
tional Court, as they considered that the constitutional jurisdic-
tion was a less promising venue to solve disputes than negoti-
ation in bilateral fora. What may be surprising is that this deci-
sion was adopted as early as 1989,101 that is, even before the 
end of the first decade of operation of the Constitutional Court, 
and that this politics of abstaining from use of the constitutional 
jurisdiction lasted for twenty-two years, with the sole exception 
of the challenge brought by the Basque Government in 2002 
against the Political Parties Act.102 Of course, this decision by 
                                                   
101  The trigger was Judgment 124/1989, of 7 July, of the Constitutional 
Court, which adjudicated on the scope of autonomous communities’ 
powers to manage the economic aspects of the national security sys-
tem. 
102  Judgment 48/2003. Three circumstances explain this exception: first, 
the challenge did not involve a clash of jurisdictions, but it was based 
on substantive constitutional grounds; second, since the two main po-
litical parties had agreed on the Political Parties Act, it was unlikely 
that any other institution holding locus standi would challenge it; and 
third, the de facto addressees of the Act were certain Basque political 
parties. 
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Basque institutions did not stop State institutions from challeng-
ing legal acts passed by their Basque counterparts and from 
seeking their automatic suspension.103  
Twenty-five years after the passing of the Constitution, Basque 
institutions began to stage a frontal collision between two claims 
of validity: the constitution-making power of the Spanish nation, 
on the one hand, and the right of the Basque people to freely 
decide on its future, on the other.104 
The first deed that brought about this collision took place on 
30 December 2004 when the Basque Parliament approved the 
draft ‘Political Statute for the Community of the Basque Country’ 
by an absolute majority – 39 to 35 –, with the opposition of the 
local sections of the socialist and conservative parties. Said 
draft purported an ambitious political accommodation of the 
Basque Country, on the basis of the recognition of a Basque 
identity and of the right to freely decide its future.  
As it stands, Spanish autonomous communities do not enjoy 
the power to adopt their own autonomy statutes; they can 
merely approve a draft that has to be submitted for examination 
and approval to the Spanish Parliament, as with any other State 
law. Thus, in this case, the Spanish Parliament rejected the 
                                                   
103  Another imbalance of the Spanish constitutional jurisdiction concerns 
the different position of autonomous communities and State organs 
with regard to interim relief. Laws and acts of the state institutions re-
main effective while pending the case after they have been challenged 
before the Court, but laws and acts of autonomous communities can 
be suspended automatically if the state government simply so wishes. 
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104  On these developments, see X. Arzoz, ‘Verfassungsentwicklung im 
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whole draft without further discussion in a totality vote on 1 Feb-
ruary 2005; the central (socialist) government chose to politi-
cally deactivate the apparent conflict between types of legiti-
macy: constitutional rule of law and democratic legitimacy. The 
previous conservative Government, however, had attempted to 
stop the reform process at its very beginning in 2003, challeng-
ing both the approval of the draft statute by the Basque Govern-
ment and its admission for discussion in the Basque Parliament 
– the first legal actions in a long and complex procedure. The 
Constitutional Court did not admit these suits for a hearing since 
it considered them preventive and incompatible with the right to 
free discussion of political issues in parliamentary democ-
racy,105 avoiding this clear attempt at instrumentalisation of the 
constitutional jurisdiction in this political struggle.  
The second deed took place on 27 June 2008; the Basque Par-
liament passed a law concerning the regulation on and the call-
ing of a popular consultation, in order to consult the people on 
the initiation of a negotiation process to achieve peace and po-
litical normality. The law reflected the same conceptions under-
lying the failed draft Statute: the right of the Basque people to 
freely decide their future, a bilateral relations model between 
the State and the Basque Country, etc. In less than four weeks 
after its publication, the Constitutional Court had unanimously 
declared the law unconstitutional on competence, substantive, 
and formal grounds.106  
                                                   
105  Order 135/2004. Five judges formulated a total of three dissenting 
opinions. For commentary in English on Order 135/2004, see Silvia 
Acierno and Julio Baquero Cruz, ‘The Order of the Spanish Constitu-
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106  Judgment 103/2008. In this regard, see Alberto López Basaguren, 
‘Sobre referéndum y Comunidades Autónomas: la Ley vasca de la 
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In both cases, the attitude of Basque institutions was fully re-
spectful of the language of the Constitution. They provocatively 
explored the limits of the constitutional framework on the basis 
of their political conceptions but did not dare to break with it. In 
particular, they did not disobey a single Constitutional Court rul-
ing, not even the one declaring the law calling for a popular con-
sultation unconstitutional and voiding it. The Basque nationalist 
party realized that they had driven into a dead-end road and 
pulled back. This was not very difficult since both failures had 
been the sole initiative of the then President of the Basque Gov-
ernment and, in the elections that soon followed, another party 
took over the Government; as a consequence, the former Pres-
ident retired from the front line of politics and paved the way for 
his party to reshape the agenda. 
b) The ‘extraordinary confrontation’: the Catalonian 
secessionist movement 
Traditionally, political life in Catalonia has been less tense and 
polarised than in the Basque Country for several reasons – 
above all, due to the absence of terrorist activities against large 
segments of the population –, and Catalonian political forces 
and institutions have generally tended to avoid confrontational 
and dissonant tones in their relationship with central institutions. 
The reform process for their statute of autonomy was also less 
disruptive than the Basque one – which failed resoundingly – 
both in substantive and procedural terms, in so far as it aimed 
                                                   
“consulta” ante el Tribunal Constitucional (consideraciones sobre la 
STC 103/2008)’, (2009) Revista d’estudis autonòmics i federals 9, 
pp. 202-240; Javier Corcuera Atienza, ‘Soberanía y autonomía. Los 
límites del “derecho a decidir”’, (2009) Revista Española de Derecho 
Constitucional 86, pp. 303-341; Javier Tajadura Tejada, ‘Referéndum 
en el País Vasco’, (2009) Teoría y Realidad Constitucional 23, 
pp. 363-385. 
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to maximize its autonomy within the constitutional framework; 
the draft was carefully prepared, drafted, discussed, and bar-
gained in Catalonia over three years (2003-2006), and the final 
text was bargained with, and passed by, the Spanish Parlia-
ment and later ratified in a referendum by the Catalonian peo-
ple.107  
Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, the statute of autonomy 
was unprecedentedly challenged before the Constitutional 
Court by the People’s Party. When the five hundred-page-long 
Judgment 31/2010 of the Constitutional Court on the constitu-
tionality of the Catalonian Autonomy Statute was finally deliv-
ered on 28 June 2010108 – four years after the challenge had 
been brought –, it disappointed many groups, though for oppos-
ing reasons.109 It annulled fifteen provisions, although in most 
                                                   
107  See Xabier Arzoz, ‘Das Autonomiestatut für Katalonien von 2006 als 
erneuter Vorstoß für die Entwicklung des spanischen Autonomiestaa-
tes’, (2009) Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völ-
kerrecht 69:1, pp. 155-193; and César Colino, ‘Constitutional change 
without constitutional reform: Spanish federalism and the revision of 
Catalonia’s statute of autonomy’, (2009) Publius: Journal of Federa-
lism 39:2, pp. 262-288. 
108  A partial translation of the judgment into English can be downloaded 
in http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/restrad/Pagi-
nas/JCC2862010en.aspx. 
109  Spanish bibliography on Judgment 31/2010 is large. Four Spanish le-
gal journals devoted special issues to the judgment: (2010) Revista 
catalana de dret públic, special issue; (2011) Revista d’Estudis Au-
tonòmics i Federals 12; (2011) Teoría y Realidad Constitucional 27; 
and (2011) Revista de Estudios Políticos 151. In addition, see Rosario 
Tur Ausina and Enrique Álvarez Conde, Las consecuencias jurídicas 
de la sentencia 31/2010, de 28 de junio del Tribunal Constitucional 
sobre el Estatuto de Cataluña: la sentencia de la perfecta libertad 
(Cizur Menor: Aranzadi-Thomson Reuters 2010); Enrique Álvarez 
Conde and Cecilia Rosado Villaverde, Estudios sobre la Sentencia 
31/2010, de 28 de junio del Tribunal Constitucional sobre el Estatuto 
de Autonomía de Cataluña (Madrid: Universidad Rey Juan Carlos 
2011); Pierre Subra de Bieusses, ‘La sentence du Tribunal 
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cases not completely but with regard to specific aspects, and 
imposed a consistent interpretation on twenty-four further pro-
visions. The sum of annulations and consistent interpretations 
deprived key aspects of the reform of their meaning and legal 
effects. 
Judgment 31/2010 unleashed a yet-unfinished cycle of tension 
with, and within, Catalonia. After several massive demonstra-
tions, the Catalonian authorities initiated a unilateral move to-
wards secession from Spain. Since then, all of their challenge 
initiatives have been declared unconstitutional and void by the 
Constitutional Court, decisions which were subsequently ig-
nored and disobeyed by further unilateral actions. Overturned 
decisions include: various laws and regulations on referenda 
(Judgments 31/2015, 32/2015 and 51/2017); several parlia-
mentary resolutions proclaiming Catalonia’s sovereignty (Judg-
ment 42/2014), initiating or preparing a constituent process 
(Judgment 259/2015 and Orders 141/2016, 170/2016 and 
24/2017) or reaffirming its political objectives against their an-
nulment by the Court (Judgment 136/2018); the holding of a 
public, informal consultation in November 2014 (Judgment 
138/2015); the holding of a referendum on independence on 
1 October 2017 (Judgment 122/2017); a law calling for a spe-
cific referendum on self-determination (Judgment 114/2017); a 
law ruling on the transition to a Catalonian Republic (Judgment 
124/2017); and even a parliamentary declaration of independ-
ence on 27 October 2017 (Order 144/2017).110  
The series of legal acts and resolutions quashed by the Court 
in the short period of three years is impressive. The legal and 
                                                   
constitutionnel espagnol sur le statut de la Catalogne (à propos de la 
décision du 28 juin 2010)’, (2011) Revue du droit public et de la 
science politique en France et à l'étranger 4, pp. 935-963. 
110  The web site of the Constitutional Court provides an English transla-
tion for the most relevant of these decisions. 
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political challenge to the supremacy of the Constitution and the 
authority of the Constitutional Court has been immense. The 
constitutional jurisdiction itself does not provide adequate rem-
edy for such a colossal challenge. Different venues, both crimi-
nal111 and constitutional law remedies, have been used and 
tested to meet the challenge. This text, however, focuses on 
constitutional law remedies, as they directly affect the role and 
independence of the Constitutional Court, starting with the re-
action of the Constitutional Court to the secessionist challenge 
and later addressing the measures of the Spanish Government. 
a) The first reaction of the Constitutional Court to the secession-
ist challenge was at the very beginning of the process on 
25 March 2014. The Court gave a principled response. The 
Constitutional Court reminded that 
[t]he Constitution does not expressly cover, nor can it cover, 
all the issues that may arise in the constitutional order, par-
ticularly those derived from the wish of part of the State to 
alter its legal status. Issues of this kind cannot be resolved 
by the Court, whose task is to ensure that the Constitution is 
strictly complied with. Thus, the public powers, to particularly 
include the territorial powers included in the Autonomous 
                                                   
111  Over twenty people including the former President and various minis-
ters of the Government of Catalonia and the former President of the 
Parliament of Catalonia have been criminally prosecuted for serious 
crimes including rebellion, sedition and disobedience connected with 
the holding of a forbidden referendum on 1 October 2017. Nine of 
them have remained detained pending trial for, so far, more than 
twelve months. The Supreme Court will rule on the case against eigh-
teen of them by the summer of 2019; the National High Court in Ma-
drid and the High Court of Catalonia will try the remaining people. 
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State, are the ones entrusted with resolving any matters aris-
ing in this field, through dialogue and cooperation.112 
This appeal to dialogue and cooperation was like ‘preaching in 
the desert’. Neither the central government nor Catalonian in-
stitutions showed readiness for dialogue. It can be argued that 
Catalonian institutions were induced, by the Government’s in-
action, to persevere on their secessionist route. In any case, 
they started to disobey the Constitutional Court rulings and or-
ders, and the Court’s discourse changed accordingly. 
The main argument behind the series of legal acts and resolu-
tions quashed by the Court is that Catalonian institutions would 
have received a ‘democratic mandate from the electorate’ which 
would bestow on them the highest legitimacy to proceed ac-
cordingly, even unilaterally.  
From a democratic point of view, this claim is not backed by 
evidence. Although regional elections conducted in September 
2017 were seen as a plebiscite by secessionist political forces, 
and political parties advocating secession even obtained a nar-
row majority of the seats of the regional Parliament, they did not 
achieve a majority of the votes (48 %). The central government 
intervened in the functioning of the autonomous community, 
and new elections were held in December 2017. However, elec-
toral results were similar. Political reality is sometimes stubborn. 
Said results correspond with neither the ‘clear majority’ principle 
elaborated by the Canadian Supreme Court in the opinion on 
Quebec113 nor the 55 %-of-the-votes rule required by the Euro-
                                                   
112  Judgment 42/2014. On this judgment, see Víctor Ferreres Comella, 
‘The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s Right to De-
cide (Comment on the Judgment 42/2014)’, (2014) European Consti-
tutional Law Review 10, pp. 571-590. 
113  Reference Re Secession of Quebec (20 August 1998), No. 25506 
(S.C.C.), paras. 92 and 151. 
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pean Union to recognise the outcome of the independence ref-
erendum in Montenegro in 2006 nor even with the two-thirds 
majority within the Parliament of Catalonia required to reform 
the statute of autonomy of Catalonia.114 
From a constitutional perspective, insistence on the democratic 
legitimacy of one’s political aspirations represents a rather old 
form of populism. In fact, the outcome was very similar to some 
developments of the last few decades in South America where 
when left-wing movements were unable to obtain the necessary 
majorities to implement their projects, they generated a consti-
tution-giving process to overwhelm the opposition and free 
themselves from constitutional limits. Similarly, Catalonian se-
cessionist forces acted as if they had received a democratic 
mandate from citizens, and that democratic mandate was given 
the significance of constitution-giving momentum, allowing law-
makers to proceed towards secession from Spain undisturbed 
by conflicting rules in the existing constitutional order; those dis-
agreeing with said interpretation and opposed to these seces-
sionist acts were labelled undemocratic. 
Apart from establishing the substantive grounds for the uncon-
stitutionality of the Catalonian institutions’ legal acts and reso-
lutions appealed before it, the Court expressly tackled their al-
leged democratic foundation, that is, the confrontation between 
the supremacy of the Constitution and the democratic legiti-
macy of the aspirations of the Catalonian people. In Judgment 
259/2015 (legal ground no. 5) the Court stated: 
In the social, democratic and rule-of-law-based State 
founded by the 1978 Constitution, democratic legitimacy 
                                                   
114  Art. 222 of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. Nevertheless, a ma-
jority of two-thirds in the Parliament of Catalonia is not enough; the 
Spanish Parliament by a vote and the Catalonian people through a 
referendum must also approve the proposed reform. 
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cannot be placed at odds with constitutional lawfulness to 
the detriment of the latter: the legitimacy of an action or pol-
icy of a public authority basically lies in whether it complies 
with the Constitution and the legal system. If one does not 
obey the Constitution, one cannot claim any legitimacy what-
soever. In a democratic conception of power, there is no 
other legitimacy than that established in the Constitution. 
Additionally, the principle of democracy – one of the highest 
values of our legal system set forth in Article 1.1 CE […] – 
being a constitutional principle, cannot be construed in iso-
lation from the rest of the constitutional system and its pro-
cesses. As we will now go on to explain, the unconditional 
supremacy of the Constitution is what safeguards democ-
racy, in that it is a source of legitimacy, due to its content, 
and because it contains procedures for its reform.  
[…] 
c) Precisely because the rule-of-law-based State is based on 
the principle of democracy, and as a result of safeguarding 
democracy itself via the rule of law, the Constitution is not an 
intangible or unchangeable legal text. In providing for consti-
tutional reform, as will be expanded on further below, it rec-
ognizes and channels aspirations – fully legitimate within the 
constitutional framework – that seek the revision and amend-
ment of the Constitution as established in Articles 167 and 
168 CE. 
From all of the foregoing it can be inferred that the alleged 
democratic legitimacy of a legislative body cannot be set at 
odds with the unconditional supremacy of the Constitution. 
The text of the Constitution reflects the pertinent manifesta-
tions of the principle of democracy, which cannot, therefore, 
be exercised beyond the bounds of the Constitution (STC 
42/2014, Ground 4 a). Therefore, the legal system, with the 
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Constitution at its pinnacle, cannot, under any circum-
stances, be considered a limit to democracy, but rather as 
its very safeguard. 
Similarly in Judgment 114/2017 (legal ground no. 5), though a 
bit more expeditious since at this time the legal act appealed 
was not a mere resolution of the Parliament, but Law 19/2017, 
of 6 September 2017, so-called “on the self-determination ref-
erendum”: 
[…] by giving up – as stated in Ground 2 of this judgment – 
any presumption of constitutionality, the autonomous as-
sembly is not entitled to legitimately claim obedience to this 
Law. A power which expressly refuses the law, also denies 
itself the possibility to be an authority worthy of observance. 
b) The response of Spanish State-level institutions has been, 
obviously, less rhetorical and more imperative. The Spanish 
Constitution provides enough instruments for the political de-
fence of the constitutional order: the proclamation of states of 
alarm, emergency and siege (Art. 116) and the adoption of co-
ercive measures against an autonomous community (Art. 155). 
Nevertheless, the Government preferred to first explore the de-
velopment of the instruments for the juridical defence of the 
Constitution, probably with the idea that, in this way, it would 
avoid its political wear and tear. 
With the unique Catalonian case in mind, public opinion was 
persuaded to believe that the Court’s rulings were not being 
duly complied with. Up to that point, the execution of the Court’s 
decisions was ruled by a general provision empowering the 
Court to take all necessary measures to execute its deci-
sions.115 Nevertheless, it was considered to be insufficient or 
                                                   
115  Art. 92 of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court. The reading of 
this provision was originally the same one as in paragraph 35 of the 
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ineffective. Thus, in October 2015, with only the votes of the 
governing People’s Party, the organic law of the Constitutional 
Court was amended to provide the Court with extended execu-
tion powers for its judgments, which can be used either at the 
Court’s own motion or at the behest of the parties. To guarantee 
the ‘effective fulfilment’ of the Court’s rulings, the new powers 
include the temporary replacement of any authority or public of-
ficial that does not comply with a Court’s ruling, the ordering of 
substitutive execution by the central government, and an in-
crease in the amount of fines up to 12,000 euros.116 The 
Basque Country and Catalonia challenged the amendment. The 
Court declared the new powers to be consistent with the Con-
stitution117 and later even used them for the first time to enforce 
its prohibition of the referendum on independence of 1 October 
2017.118 Nevertheless, the Venice Commission raised doubts 
on the attribution of said powers to the Constitutional Court, de-
claring it to be unusual in European constitutional jurisdiction 
models on the grounds that ‘the attribution of the power of exe-
cution of its decisions to the Constitutional Court may seem to 
be an increase of power at first sight. However, the division of 
competences of adjudicating on the one hand, and of executing 
                                                   
German Law of the Federal Constitutional Court, from which it was 
taken. 
116  See Art. 92 of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court, as 
amended by Organic Law no. 15/2015, of 16 October 2015. 
117  Judgments 185/2016 and 215/2016, both with three dissenting votes. 
118  Orders 126/2017 and 127/2017. In 2018, the 3rd Section of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights dismissed the individual application 
no. 70219/17, Montserrat Aumatell i Arnau vs. Spain, submitted by 
one of the individuals whom a daily penalty (astrainte) of 6,000 euros 
had been imposed to achieve the full compliance with a Constitutional 
Court’s previous injunction not to take part in the electoral supervision 
of the unconstitutional referendum of 1 October 2017; nevertheless, 
the penalty had been lifted since she resigned immediately from the 
electoral body she had been appointed to, before she submitted her 
individual application to the ECHR. 
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its results [on the other,] strengthens the system of checks and 
balances as a whole, and in the end, also the independence of 
the Constitutional Court.’119 
In the end, the extension of the Court’s execution powers was 
not enough. The continued disobedience of the Constitutional 
Court’s rulings prompted the State Government, with the previ-
ous approval of the Senate, to adopt exceptional measures of 
coercion against Catalonia’s Government and Parliament under 
Art. 155 of the Constitution and to call for new elections in Cat-
alonia on 27 October 2017. This has yet to help clear up the 
situation; the elections held in December 2017 resulted in the 
same composition of the Catalonian Parliament, with a majority 
of the popular vote going to non-secessionist parties and a ma-
jority of seats going to Catalonian secessionist parties. In any 
case, the new Government has not broken with the old one nor 
with its plans of secession. 
                                                   
119  Opinion 827/2015 of the European Commission for Democracy 
Through Law (Venice Commission), on the Law of 16 October 2015 
amending the Organic Law no. 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court, 
point 77. Strasbourg, 13 March 2017.  
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IV. Conclusion 
A Constitutional Court cannot remain totally insulated from po-
litical actors. In all democracies, appointment of constitutional 
judges is reserved for political organs, mainly legislative cham-
bers, as a means to guarantee the legitimacy of the institution. 
Over the short history of the Spanish Constitutional Court, there 
have been better periods and worse periods as far as its inde-
pendence is concerned. The judges of the Constitutional Court 
have the duty to defend their impartiality and their dignity 
against interference (Art. 22 of the Organic Law of the Consti-
tutional Court). Nevertheless, criticism of politicisation should 
not be directed only at the Court. It is not the Court which polit-
icises itself, but rather leaders of political parties and the media 
who try to interfere. The independence and proper functioning 
of a Constitutional Court is not only a matter of institutional de-
sign, but above all, a question of ethics and self-restraint. Both 
cultural changes and institutional reforms are necessary. 
A minimum reform package for improved independence and 
functioning of the Spanish Constitutional Court should include 
the following elements. First, political parties should progres-
sively eradicate the culture of appropriating posts in constitu-
tional bodies such as the Constitutional Court. To that effect, 
more transparency in the selecting procedure, more autonomy 
for parliamentarians to propose and veto candidates, and more 
control by civil society may be instrumental in this regard. Sec-
ond, constitutional judges must only be appointed by the two 
legislative chambers of the State, given that segmented election 
of judges has not prevented their patrimonialisation by political 
parties. Third, half of the judges should be elected by a Senate 
that truly represents the autonomous communities, and in that 
election, expertise and sensitivity in the promotion of autonomy 
should be decisive. Fourth, a limitation on the number of career 
 63 
judges sitting on the Court and a retirement age for constitu-
tional judges, consistent with that governing the retirement of 
university professors and judges of the Supreme Court, should 
be established, and last but not least, political parties must let 
the Court do its job. 
A Constitutional Court has relevant tasks to fulfil in a democ-
racy, but it cannot solve all the problems that may arise in a 
constitutional order. It is not an alternative nor does it provide 
institutional compensation for failing constitutional dialogue or 
lacking constitutional amendments, nor does it increase the 
Constitutional Court’s authority to make it the only venue for 
dealing with serious challenges to the normativity of the Consti-
tution, challenges that constitute a deep-seeded political prob-
lem. 
